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Digital technology has transformed every aspect of society. From online grocery 
shopping and dating platforms to parking meter apps, digitization has reshaped the world 
around us. This project explores technology’s impact on the “world’s second oldest 
profession”: espionage.  
 
New developments in technology have both benefited and challenged human intelligence 
gathering. Gone are the days where agents can easily exchange information at personal 
meetings or via handling officers traveling to and from foreign countries undercover. The 
mobile phone and ubiquitous data have made these techniques complicated. Sophisticated 
governments like China and Russia, along with the U.S., have employed advanced 
biometric technology in transportation hubs to monitor the whereabouts of suspected 
government officials abroad. While technology has managed to make aspects of 
espionage faster, cheaper, and more efficient, it has also created demand for new 
techniques to combat its increased breadth and capabilities.  
 
This project analyzes the impact of technology using the agent recruitment process. The 
introduction considers the impact of technology on society in general and will discuss the 
implications for the intelligence community. The introduction also touches on the vital 
role of human collection and factors that motivate individuals to spy on their own 
country. The project is divided into sections to discuss each step of the agent recruitment 
cycle: spot, assess, develop, recruit, handle, and terminate. Each section employs 
examples to demonstrate how traditional techniques compare to the new methods of the 
digital age and analyzes the associated benefits and challenges of advanced technology.  
 
Much of the research for this project consists of examples from news stories surrounding 
intelligence successes and failures. It also includes insights developed from informational 
interviews with former and current intelligence professionals who have been forced to 
adapt to the digital revolution and witnessed how it has transformed their profession. 
These conversations help identify the ways in which the intelligence community has 
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adapted to rapid changes in technology and what obstacles remain to be overcome to 
continue receiving national security information from human sources.  
 
The conclusion considers the overall implications of the technology on the intelligence 
community and how, in the midst of technological disruption, the intelligence community 
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ESPIONAGE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS IMPACTING THE 
RECRUITMENT AND HANDLING OF SPIES 
 
The ability of America’s intelligence agencies to gather important information from spies 
will depend in the coming years on their ability to exploit (and defend against) high 
technology being developed at a rapid pace by businesses worldwide.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S. presidents and lawmakers “rely on insights from the Central Intelligence Agency to 
help inform their foreign policy decisions” (“INTelligence: Human Intelligence”). The 
CIA along with 15 other government agencies comprise the United States intelligence 
community. Together, these agencies work to collect, analyze, and deliver intelligence to 
policymakers so they have the information they need to secure the nation.  
 
Human intelligence is the intelligence discipline that relies on human sources to acquire 
and convey information about the plans and intentions of foreign governments. Human 
intelligence, also known as espionage, is often lightheartedly referred to as the “world’s 
second oldest profession.” It is the practice of using spies or spying methods to obtain 
information about another country without their knowledge. Throughout history, spies 
have been mobilized to “create political, military, and economic advantage” (Lerner). 
 
Stealing secrets and spying on a nation’s enemies dates back to ancient times. Egyptian 
hieroglyphics depict the use of court spies and pharaohs’ efforts to identify “disloyal  
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subjects and to locate tribes that could be conquered and enslaved” (Lerner). The 
Egyptians were among the first to develop poisons and toxins to assassinate enemy 
leaders. Greek city-states used espionage as a powerful political tool to spy on rival-states 
and “provide rulers with information on military strength and defenses” (Lerner). In 
Ancient China, philosopher Sun Tzu is celebrated for writing a treatise on military 
strategy titled “The Art of War” that emphasized espionage for its utility in gaining 
military advantage over an adversary.  
 
No group in history relied more heavily on spying than ancient Rome. The expansive 
empire spied on its neighbors to assess their military strength and resources beyond the 
bounds of the Roman control. The Romans also “employed intelligence forces to 
infiltrate tribal organizations and convinced leaders to join in alliance with Rome” 
(Lerner). The practice of espionage became increasingly important throughout the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance and into the modern age.  
 
Similarly, rebels in the French and American Revolutions relied greatly on intelligence to 
offset their disadvantage in conventional military strength. The Industrial Revolution 
transformed traditional espionage tradecraft, providing new tools for stealing secrets. The 
Industrial Revolution paved the way for a new kind of espionage, known as industrial 
espionage, defined as “the theft of business trade secrets used by a competitor to achieve 
a competitive advantage” (Kenton). Spies began to steal trade secrets and intellectual  
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property to match innovation by international rivals. In 1837, the invention of the 
photograph “permitted agents of espionage to portray targets, documents, and other 
interests as they actually were” (Lerner).  
 
Espionage was further revolutionized as transportation and communication methods 
improved. The invention of the telegraph allowed governments to send coded messages 
and to monitor communications between other countries. By the twentieth century, 
espionage “had evolved into a specialized, technical field” employed by a variety of 
states (Lerner). Shortly after the outbreak of WWII, the United States established its first 
centralized intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services, a forerunner of today’s 
CIA. After the war, the focus of American intelligence shifted to “more research and 
analysis than field operations” (Lerner).  
 
Before the disruptions of the digital revolution, human intelligence served as a unique 
source of intelligence information for governments. Human intelligence or HUMINT, is 
gathered from individuals who have either volunteered or been recruited to spy on their 
own countries. According to the CIA, HUMINT is collected through “clandestine 
acquisition of photography, documents, and other material, overt collection by people 
overseas, debriefing of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who travel abroad, and official 
contact with foreign governments” (“INTelligence: Human Intelligence”). Human 
intelligence gathering is undertaken by CIA employees known as case officers. These  
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individuals are responsible for recruiting sources, referred to as “agents,” and securing 
from these persons a range of foreign intelligence objectives vital to national security 
(“INTelligence: Human Intelligence”). Case officers are hired and trained to have a keen 
understanding of human nature. Persuading someone to spy on their own country is no 
simple task. The ability to understand people, each filled with emotion, desires, biases, 
and complexities, is crucial for running assets and collecting human intelligence. 
(“INTelligence: Human Intelligence”).   
 
Human intelligence is uniquely valuable and is often the only way to learn the plans and 
intentions of a foreign government. The use of individuals to gather information needed 
by the president, U.S. military commanders, and senior policymakers is risky to those 
involved. If humans are tasked to collect information, it is for good reason, most often 
because there is no alternative means of acquiring it. Human intelligence can often fill in 
the gaps left by signals intelligence (SIGINT), open source intelligence, and geospatial 
intelligence.  
 
Marc Polymeropoulos, a former CIA senior operations officer, asserts that there is “no 
substitute for what is in essence a human spy” (Polymeropoulos [16:15:00]). Human 
sources can penetrate terrorist groups to gather information about planned attacks on 
Americans, trade negotiations with foreign actors, or even a hidden nuclear program. A 
source working in the inner circle of a foreign leader can provide an understanding of the  
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intentions of an adversarial government. This kind of information is typically beyond the 
scope of technical collection which makes human intelligence an invaluable method of 
information collection. The Directorate of Operations, the branch of the CIA responsible 
for human intelligence missions, works with other elements of the Agency to uncover the 
most detailed plans of U.S. adversaries (Polymeropoulos [16:30:00]). One feature that 
sets human intelligence apart from other collection disciplines, is the ability to go back 
and ask agents follow-up or clarifying questions (Morrell [17:04:00]). SIGINT, for 
example, is only as good as the individuals who interpret it. While humans can be messy 
and unpredictable, the interactive nature of agent handling contributes to the value of 
human intelligence.  
 
DIGITAL REVOLUTION 
The digital revolution began with the transition from analog to digital technology. Digital 
information “is recorded in binary code of combinations of the digits 0 and 1, also called 
bits, which represent words and images” (“Digital Technology”). Digitization “enables 
immense amounts of information to be compressed on small storage devices that can 
easily be preserved and transported” and “quickens data transmission speeds” (“Digital 
Technology”). As a result, digital technology has impacted every aspect of society-- 
education, healthcare, manufacturing, mass communications--to name a few. People have 
never been more connected. Disruptive innovations, “such as the Internet, social media, 
mobile phones and apps, cloud computing, big data, e-commerce, and the 
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consumerization of IT--have already had a transformational effect on production, 
services, and business processes around the world” (Bojanova 8).  
 
Online dating apps, residential parking meters, airline booking, and food delivery are just 
a few examples of daily activities revolutionized by technology. Digitization has 
completely transformed the structure by which businesses and societies operate, yet 
technology continues to evolve. Researcher Irena Bojanova wrote that the “ongoing 
Digital Revolution and new techno-economic paradigms will challenge organizations and 
individuals to redefine and upgrade their systems, acquire new skills, and foster new 
mindsets” (8). Like all industries, the U.S. intelligence community has been uniquely 
affected by the forces of technology. 
  
The digital revolution has forced “the CIA to reconsider everything from how and where 
it recruits officers to where it trains potential agency personnel” (McLaughlin and 
Dorfman). In 2015, as a response to the onslaught of digital technology, then-CIA 
Director John Brennan restructured the Agency. Before the change, Agency employees 
were assigned to one of four directorates: the Directorate of Operations (DO), responsible 
for espionage, the Directorate of Intelligence, responsible for analyzing and synthesizing 
raw information, the Directorate of Science and Technology, responsible for creating and 
developing spy craft technology and equipment, and the Directorate of Support, 
responsible for providing financial and medical services, materials and equipment, 
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transportation, security, and managing the logistical needs for facilities abroad (“Support 
to Mission”).  
 
Brennan’s new structure included a fifth, brand-new directorate, the Directorate of 
Digital Innovation. This new directorate is responsible for “the integration of our [the 
U.S. intelligence community’s] digital and cyber capabilities” (Schwartz). The CIA 
website refers to the Directorate of Digital Innovation or the DDI as the “engine of 
creativity, integration, and rigor that the CIA needs in the digital age, ensuring that our 
culture, tradecraft, and knowledge management across the board are more than equal to 
the challenges and opportunities of the rapidly changing world in which we operate” 
(“Digital Innovation”).  
 
The DDI works vigorously to keep up with rapid technological advances and focuses on 
developing the “tools and techniques they need to excel and prevail in the cyber and big 
data arenas” to protect U.S. national security interests and competitiveness. The new 
directorate’s focus on data hopes to provide the CIA with “greater insights from 
analytics” (Lyngaas). The partnership between the four directorates and the Directorate of 
Digital Innovation ensures that the Agency adapts to the new challenges of the digital era.  
 
The DO, “strengthens national security and foreign policy objectives through the 
clandestine collection of human intelligence (HUMINT), and by conducting covert action  
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as directed by the President” (“Directorate of Operations”). DO Case Officers, also 
known as Operations Officers, are tasked with “clandestinely spotting, assessing, 
developing, recruiting, and handling non-US citizens with access to foreign intelligence 
vital to US foreign policy and national security decision makers” (“Directorate of 
Operations”).  
 
Case officers, through classroom instruction and role-playing exercises, are tied to the 
“agent recruitment cycle.” A case officer develops the skills required to spot, assess, 
develop, recruit, handle, and terminate agents. Each step of this cycle is important and 
serves to judge the targeted person’s access to secret information, personality, 
trustworthiness, and motivation. As noted, a prospective agent must have access to 
valuable information and must also possess the right personality and temperament.  
 
Conventionally, case officers would conduct each phase of the agent recruitment cycle on 
a face to face basis. That is, each step of the cycle, involves in-person contact and can be 
a long, costly, and often dangerous process for the CIA and the potential source. Personal 
meetings are considered the most vulnerable aspect of an agent operation. The time of 
physical proximity is the most vulnerable period for both the intelligence officer and the 
agent. Countries like “the USA, the Federal German Republic, Great Britain, Sweden, 
Holland '' and especially Russia, use intense counterintelligence measures to conduct 
thorough surveillance operations which makes physical agent meetings in foreign  
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countries extremely risky (Konovalov and Sokolov). Physical meetings are dangerous 
“because the intelligence officer is often under surveillance and is naturally not always 
successful in ensuring his own secure approach to a meeting” (Konovalov and Sokolov).  
 
Furthermore, case officers may spend months or even years assessing and developing 
targets before they agree to spy for the United States. As a result, the information 
acquired by these sources may not be timely or valuable.  
 
However, there are new possibilities for human intelligence in the digital age. Digital 
technology may, in certain circumstances, eliminate the need for physical meetings 
between case officers and prospective agents. While technology has created new 
challenges for government officials charged with protecting national security 
information, fully leveraging technology in the agent recruitment process will ultimately 
increase the effectiveness and security of espionage by CIA and other U.S. IC agencies 
with a HUMINT mission.  
 
AGENT RECRUITMENT CYCLE 
SPOT 
The agent recruitment cycle begins when individuals, most often foreign nationals, are 
“spotted” or identified based on their ability to answer the most urgent questions of U.S. 
intelligence analysts or policymakers. These individuals must have some kind of access  
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to information regarding foreign countries or non-state adversaries. For instance, if a 
government needed information about North Korean nuclear capabilities, it would be 
vital to identify or “spot” someone who works in a nuclear facility there. Traditionally, 
these employees would be identified through surveillance, stolen documents, or other 
agents. Finding potential agents may require knowing who enters and leaves the facility 
each day. Potential agents are targeted through already mobilized human sources, or 
through stolen physical information, such as phone books, employee indexes, or 
residential addresses. 
 
An existing source, known as an access agent, may have contacts in the targeted 
community or may be recruited to frequent local bars in an attempt to find out about the 
personal and professional lives of the residents in the community, in the hopes of 
identifying somebody who has access to desired information. For instance, he or she may 
monitor employees entering and exiting a military facility every day. Spotting potential 
agents can be time consuming and costly, as success is not guaranteed. 
 
Using the traditional approach, intelligence officers have a few options: (1) agents can 
meet with a representative who has “entered the country without having aroused the 
suspicion of authorities;” (2) agents and intelligence officers can arrange meetings in a 
neutral third country with plausible cover stories to “explain their simultaneous arrival;” 
and (3) to conduct a physical meeting on US territory with a good cover story for the  
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visiting agent (Konovalov and Sokolov).  
 
While these options can improve the safety of a physical meeting, there is no guarantee 
that intelligence officers and agents will evade detection. There is always some degree of 
risk involved in human espionage, particularly when the case officer and his or her agent 
is in the same location at the same time.   
 
Online social and professional profiles have made the process of spotting potential agents 
considerably easier, faster, and most importantly, safer. In the digital age, operations 
officers can screen open source social media profiles to identify targets while avoiding 
time-consuming, costly and potentially dangerous surveillance or access agent 
operations.  
 
Furthermore, a case officer (or targeting officer) is not limited to open sources to find 
who works at a suspect facility and has access to secrets. The U.S. intelligence 
community can hack into a firm’s databases, payroll records, phone records and listings, 
parking assignments, etc., to find out the name of people working there. 
 
This technology is equally available to foreign intelligence services seeking to collect 
U.S. secrets. For example, Chinese intelligence officers use LinkedIn to identify potential 
foreign recruits (Lee). The Chinese intelligence service enlists individuals known as  
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“spotters” who search for “potential targets, then hand them off to another intelligence 
officer for further assessment” (Graff). These spotters are typically “friendly officials at 
think tanks, universities, or corporations” (Graff). These individuals do not carry out the 
recruitment process themselves. They are “considered too valuable to make a recruitment 
approach directly,” in other words, they are big wigs at large corporations who operate 
under “deep cover” (Graff).  
 
According to the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 
William E. Evanina, “it’s more efficient to sit behind a computer in China and send out 
friend requests to thousands of targets using fake profiles” than “dispatching spies to the 
U.S. to recruit a single target” (E. Wong). In May 2019, former employee of the CIA and 
DIA, Kevin Mallory was sentenced to 20 years in prison for espionage against the U.S. 
that began with a LinkedIn message from a Chinese intelligence official (E. Wong). 
LinkedIn, Evanina describes, is “the ultimate playground for collection” as the Chinese 
are “contacting thousands of people at a time.” Not only are foreign recruiters after 
classified political information, they are interested in the collection of corporate trade 
secrets, intellectual property, and other research (E. Wong).  
 
The same is true for the U.S. intelligence community. Through digitization, the spotting 
process is made more efficient, less time consuming and lowers the overall cost. With a 
click of a mouse, safe inside the four walls of the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, 
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an operations officer can send feelers out to masses of potential agents to 1) increase 
spotting efficacy and 2) improve operational safety. 
 
The Kevin Mallory example highlights the important consequences of digital age 
technology. While technology has the potential to increase the efficacy of the spotting 
process, the digital revolution also broadens the susceptibility to targeting from foreign 
intelligence services. The Federal Bureau of Investigation announced, “that anyone who 
publicly identified themselves as a government official was at risk for being contacted by 
foreign spies” (Batt). LinkedIn is an especially vulnerable platform because it has over 
645 million users who are employment recruiters, headhunters, individuals who are 
employed and unemployed persons seeking new opportunities. Some public officials on 
the platform disclose their security clearances in the hope of improving their appeal and 
employment opportunities which, in turn, makes these individuals prime targets (E. 
Wong). Kevin Mallory, the former IC officer, was targeted and persuaded to spy for an 
adversary via social media.  
 
In another case, former Obama senior foreign policy official, in the months after leaving 
his government job and visiting China, received a LinkedIn message from an employee 
of a company called R&C Capital identified as “Robinson Zhang.” His message read: 
“I’m quite impressed by your CV and think you may be right for some opportunities, 
which are all well paid.” The targeter offered the individual an all-expense paid trip to  
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China. The official, unsure about the legitimacy of the company, requested a website link 
to validate the Zhang’s claims. The website, he later acknowledged, looked like 
“something he made up on the fly” (E. Wong). The company did not exist in the location 
listed as the address and was not registered in the Hong Kong corporate database (E. 
Wong).  
 
The U.S. is not the only victim of Chinese phishing for potential agents. German and 
French intelligence organizations believe that over 10,000 German and 4,000 French 
citizens were targeted via LinkedIn by Chinese intelligence agents. In addition to 
leveraging the reach of technology, the US intelligence community must focus on its 
counterintelligence capabilities to thwart foreign influence and safeguard national 
security.  
 
Employees of the CIA are instructed to be discrete on their social media accounts. They 
obviously cannot list the name of their employer and are told not to tag coworkers in their 
Facebook photos. Former CIA Deputy Director David Cohen explained that “we [the 
CIA] must find ways to protect our officers who increasingly have a digital footprint 
from birth” (Ewing).   
 
Intelligence officials have expressed frustration with social media and generational 
norms. New recruits to the CIA, “particularly those born in the age of social media,  
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ha[ve] become more difficult...with the Agency lacking clearly defined policies for social  
media use” (McLaughlin and Dorfman). One former Agency official claimed that the 
“CIA has adopted the position of ‘we’re not going to help you, but you better not do it 
wrong” (Pagliery). Until recently, the Agency advised employees of the social media 
generation to delete their online profiles altogether. This position has since changed 
because “such behavior could be seen as suspicious” in its own right (McLaughlin and 
Dorfman). The U.S. intelligence community currently struggles to find ways to protect 
their employees from being digitally linked to the IC. 
 
The Internet has become a particularly effective spotting tool for recruiters of Al Qaeda 
and the Islamic State. In her New York Times podcast “Caliphate,” Rukmini Callimachi 
interviewed Jesse Morton, an American recruit to Al Qaeda, who became “one of the 
most prolific recruiters for the group online” (Callimachi [15:45:00]). When asked how 
he recruits young jihadists, he explained that he spots individuals that “express interest 
through email” or “are consistently logging into your conversation” (Callimachi 
[16:00:00]). These individuals are drawn into radical propaganda--baited with media 
graphics, videos, speeches, and textual information. Those individuals who are 
consistently joining such conversations online and engaging with the propaganda are 
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Social media has the potential to change indelibly the spotting phase in the agent  
recruitment cycle. By enlisting technology, spotters can quickly and safely identify  
potential targets with access to desired information. Social media gives spotters the 
ability to contact numerous individuals at one time and also conceal their true identities 
and aims. Technology has expanded the capabilities of intelligence officers in their 
search for foreign assets to provide information to protect national security. At the same 
time, however, the IC must focus on its counterintelligence practices to thwart foreign 
spotting activities among U.S. officials.  
 
ASSESS 
After a target with access to secrets is identified, the next step of the agent acquisition 
cycle is to assess the targeted person. These targets are assessed to determine if they may 
be ultimately willing to spy and if their personality and personal traits are suitable for this 
role. Case officers determine “whether the spotted individuals have the placement and 
access to provide desired information” and determine the “motivations, vulnerabilities, 
and suitability” of the particular target (Burkett 13). Either before or during this phase in 
the cycle, personal contact with the target agent is customarily established to begin 
building personal relationship. This relationship and a plausible basis for continuing 
contact helps case officers carry on assessing the target to “explore whether they will be 
responsive to initial tasking for intelligence information” (Burkett 13).  
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Case officers often travel to professional conferences or diplomatic events to initiate 
contact with a recruitment target. Case officers may adopt cover positions and present  
themselves as diplomats or citizens of a third country. When an officer assumes the 
identity as a citizen of a third country, this approach is known as a “false flag.” In false 
flag operations, “actions are attributed to entities other than the ones actually conducting 
them” (Petkus 115). The personal contact and direct assessment often determine whether 
a particular individual might make a good spy. Meanwhile, case officers “explore 
exploitable weakness which may be used as a lever against a recruit” (“Foreign 
Intelligence”). These vulnerabilities may include drug and alcohol abuse, financial 
troubles or even an illness in the family (“Foreign Intelligence”).  
 
Case officers are not looking for well-adjusted people. Asking someone to spy is not a 
normal request. The targeted individual must demonstrate vulnerable traits or motivations 
that would compel them to consider accepting such a risky offer. Research confirms that 
individuals agree to spy for a number of reasons. In her article, “Why Spy? The 
Psychology of Espionage,” CIA psychologist Ursula Wilder identified three main 
conditions for a person’s willingness to spy: “(1) dysfunctions in the personality; (2) a 
state of crisis; and (3) ease of opportunity” (20). Individuals who spy often demonstrate 
thrill-seeking characteristics as well as lack a sense of responsibility and are often in 
search of power and control. Spies regard their behavior as a last resort or the only logical 
solution to a given state of crisis or distress. Ease of opportunity is also an important 
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factor. Individuals must have ready access to the means to address their immediate crisis. 
The case officer offers this opportunity. 
 
The combination of these conditions creates the perfect agent candidate. Wilder explains 
that individuals with personality disorders tend to find themselves wrapped up in life 
crises which eventually lead to relationship, family and financial troubles. These 
“personal crises will, in turn, further stress and magnify problematic traits” (Wilder 21). 
Case officers will then “insinuate themselves into the situation and find ways to 
exacerbate personal crisis” (Wilder 21). Individuals with a motive to spy, the right 
personality and access to desired information are excellent candidates for agent 
recruitment.  
 
In 1985, Aldrich Ames, chief of the counterintelligence branch in CIA’s Soviet and East 
European Division, notably one of the most notorious spies in history, sold the names of 
two agents reporting to the KGB in the United States. He was given $50,000 for this 
information. He continued to provide information to Soviet intelligence officers about the 
CIA and its operations in Moscow. Later that year, he received a $2 million-dollar 
wedding gift from the KGB for his services. To avoid raising suspicions about his new-
found wealth, the KGB held much of this money “in escrow” for Ames’s future use.  His 
relationship with the Soviets continued for nine years including assignments in Rome and 
CIA Headquarters in Virginia. Ames was eventually unmasked and arrested in 1994.  
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When asked to explain his motive for betraying his country, Ames responded “money--
money was the motivation” (Weiner). He claims that he did not believe his actions to be  
“affecting the security of this country [the United States] and the safety of its people.” He 
went on to claim that “very few have sold secrets to the KGB...because many of them 
would have found--there were a lot of barriers in the way” (Weiner). As chief of SE 
Division’s counterintelligence branch with the job of helping run Soviet agents 
worldwide, Ames was perfectly positioned to steal and sell secrets to the KGB. A painful 
divorce, financial troubles and ease of opportunity paved the way for Aldrich Ames to 
compromise the identities of many US assets in the Soviet Union and cement his 
reputation as one of the most damaging spies in U.S. history.  
 
Digitization has created new techniques for agent assessment. Instead of meeting 
potential targets face to face, social media, online chat rooms and instant messaging 
enable case officers to assess potential agents virtually via the Internet. A case officer can 
learn valuable assessment information about a potential agent in a matter of minutes 
online, a process that may have taken many years to learn through face-to-face contacts.  
Through platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and LinkedIn, case officers can 
quickly discover an individual's interests and hobbies, personal and professional 
networks, worldview, personality, as well as family and relationship status. Using only 
open source media--or information gained by hacking into a target’s phone or personal 
computer, intelligence officers can judge an individual's financial situation, emotional 
stability and suitability to spy.  
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For instance, social media posts may reveal that a target has a deep distain for the United 
States which may lead to unsuccessful agent recruitment. This type of assessment 
information might cause the operation to move forward under a false flag. As previously 
mentioned, false flag operation occurs when a case officer intentionally pretends to work 
for a different country, company or group to misdirect a potential agent about one’s 
loyalties.   
 
However, the target’s online activity may also inform a case officer of a family member 
who needs treatment for an illness. As a result, the case officer may be able offer 
medication in exchange for information. Through friendships, photos, status updates, and 
connections, intelligence officers can unearth the daily routines and interactions of a 
target individual. These findings help case officers understand the overall personal and 
professional life of a target and provide insight for deepening a relationship with this 
individual.  
 
Internet users tend to be less guarded on social media and often demonstrate a misguided 
sense of privacy online. According to a New York Times study about the psychology of 
online sharing, 68% of people share personal information online to “give people a better 
sense of who they are and what they care about” (“The Psychology of Sharing”). As a 
result, online social media profiles give intelligence officers a perfect tool to efficiently 
and anonymously assess potential agents. 
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New technical capabilities also enable more extreme and detailed digital surveillance. For 
deeper insights, intelligence services may hack an individual’s computer or cell phone to 
analyze search histories, email correspondence, digital documents and other private 
information. Today, computer users frequently set up remote desktops to access computer 
programs and files mobile devices. Skilled CIA hackers, when pursuing lawful foreign 
targets, can remotely infiltrate computer desktops and mobile devices of potential sources 
to aid in the assessment process.  
 
The Internet has not only eliminated the need for face to face contact but can create an 
online virtual dialogue between recruiters and potential targets. The Islamic State, as 
previously mentioned, releases immense amounts of propaganda online for young people 
to read, watch, and experience. In the New York Times podcast titled “Caliphate” 
Rukmini Callimachi interviewed a former jihadist Abu Huyzafah about his recruitment to 
ISIS. 
 
For ISIS, the spotting and assessment stages are combined. Huyzafah, for example, was a 
Muslim immigrant from Pakistan living in Canada. He was a seemingly normal kid from 
a middle-class background who loved Star Wars. His family never experienced any sort 
of religious discrimination. However, Huyzafah wanted “something bigger… not 
something simple and boring” (Callimachi [03:35:00]). As a young Muslim kid growing  
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up in the middle of the U.S. war on terror and the digital age, Huyzafah took to MySpace  
in search of identity and information about the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Huyzafah 
eventually finds himself in “forums, in chat rooms, where Al Qaeda and later ISIS 
recruiters are lurking” meanwhile listening to the lectures of Anwar al-Awlaki, a 
charismatic Islamic religious leader and proponent of violence (Callimachi [09:25:00]). 
 
Huzayfah “followed a bunch of their [ISIS recruiters] pages on Tumblr” and even “tried 
to contact them on Facebook '' and Instagram (Callimachi [14:05:00]). He eventually 
developed relationships with ISIS recruiters online. They answered his questions about 
the basis for suicide bombings, and killings, with sound religious justifications. Most 
importantly, he felt heard and accepted. Callamachi described this process as ISIS 
recruiters “reach[ing] through the internet” to “hold their hand as they started down the 
funnel of radicalization” ([13:40:00]).  
 
In essence, ISIS recruiters operating from safe havens in Syria and Libya, use social 
media as platform to connect with and develop jihadist recruits. Callamachi describes the 
“tens of thousands of people like Huzayfah who are circling these internet watering 
holes” (Callimachi [14:05:00]). The internet and social media platforms provide both 
information and a deep sense of community to young, lost individuals. Individuals like 
Huzayfah buy into the radical ideology while ISIS recruiters stand ready in online 
chatrooms to spot and assess vulnerable individuals to join the jihad.  
 
            28 
DEVELOP 
After a target with access to secrets is assessed or deemed suitable to spy the 
development process begins. In an interview at Harvard, former CIA deputy director for 
operations, Michael Sulick, described the development process as “another word for 
cultivating personal relationships” (3). This involves spending time with a target, 
exploring shared interests, communicating frequently and getting to know one another. 
This relationship is established based on trust and indebtedness.  
 
The “principle of reciprocation” is vital during this stage. In his article, “An Alternative 
Framework for Agent Recruitment,” CIA historian Randy Burkett asserted that “one of 
the easiest ways for a case officer to initiate and develop a relationship with a potential 
agent is to fill some small need the agent has revealed” (14). These small gestures may 
involve obtaining scarce medicine for a family member, helping with a visa application, 
finding employment opportunities, a kind gesture, or offering sincere personal advice. 
Any favor or act of kindness creates in the recipient a sense of obligation. Burkett 
suggests that in “the agent recruitment process, small commitments in the development 
phase… can grow into full recruitments” (16). In any case, reciprocation is successful 
when a target feels indebted to a case officer and paves the way for a case officer to ask 
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Persuading an individual to betray his or her own country and spy for you requires trust.  
Sulick addresses the question of using blackmail to coerce individuals to give up secrets. 
He asserts that “blackmail doesn’t work practically” (3). Case officers want agents who 
will freely cooperate. If someone is being forced to commit espionage, he or she “will 
give you as little information as possible and be as uncooperative as possible” (Sulick 3). 
This is not the kind of individual who can provide national security information to the 
U.S.   
 
During the development phase, “case officers will often demonstrate their authority by 
indicating they have special positions or powers beyond whatever jobs they claim to hold 
in the US government or business” (Burkett 14). For instance, case officers may claim the 
ability to “richly reward consultants,” setting the foundation for future monetary 
compensation (Burkett 14). The impulse to reciprocate and a case officer’s aura of 
authority give foreign targets the impression that case officers are credible. During 
development, case officers set the conditions before they formally ask a target to spy.  
 
Before the digital revolution, the development phase, like the others, was conducted face 
to face. Furthermore, the development stage was similarly time consuming, costly and 
risky because it required frequent point of contact that may attract the attention of 
interested security services. Case officers could devote years to socializing, spending 
time with one another’s families, and establishing shared interests to build a personal 
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relationship with a potential agent. However, the internet has provided people with many 
tools to find community, shared interests and build meaningful relationships online. 
 
In the digital age, the concept of an “internet relationship” is a widely accepted 
phenomenon. Wikipedia defines an internet relationship as a relationship between two 
people who have met online, and in many cases know each other only via the internet. 
According to Statista, in 2019, the average amount of time a person spends on social 
media per day is 144 minutes (Clement). That is, about two and half hours of reading 
material posted on social media outlets like Facebook and Instagram, communicating 
with other online users via Twitter or WhatsApp, and engaging in online exchanges.  
 
People access dating sites like Bumble and Tinder to connect with others seeking a 
partner. Similarly, others use blog sites like Tumblr to share interests. Facebook groups 
are popular for fandoms and social movements. For example, on Netflix’s new docuseries 
“Don't F*ck with Cats: Hunting an Internet Killer” a team of cat lovers and animal rights 
activists were enraged by a video of an individual brutally murdering a cat. They formed 
a Facebook group to find and stop the perpetrator whose violence escalated to the murder 
to human beings. Two key individuals, using aliases “John Green” and “Baudi Moovan” 
were the leaders of the group. Through teamwork and persistence, the group identified 
the dangerous individual and saved the lives of potential victims. Group members, who  
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had never met face to face, developed strong online relationships based on a shared 
cause. They are still virtual friends today.  
 
In Rukmini Callamachi’s New York Times podcast, “Caliphate,” Huzayfah believed in 
and felt loyal to the Islamic State and its ideology. Through the countless conversations 
with online recruiters, Huzayfah developed strong personal relationships and deepened 
his belief in the ideology of the Islamic State. Huzayfah eventually reached out to active 
online ISIS recruiters to initiate his journey to jihad. According to Huzayfah, the 
recruiters “had everything planned out,” all of the logistics and all he “had to do was just 
take the step.” ISIS recruiters basically had a “do-it yourself guide” with information on 
everything from plane tickets, to safe houses to trusted smugglers. Huzayfah arranged his 
travel and a cover story for his parents and continued on his journey to jihad.  
 
While he was enlisted as a young jihadist martyr rather than a foreign agent, technology 
enabled ISIS recruiters to successfully persuade Huzayfah to join the Islamic State. ISIS 
recruiters working in Syria and Libya managed to convince Huzayfah, who was living a 
normal life in Canada, to travel halfway around the world and join their cause. While face 
to face interactions have the potential to deepen human connection, technology can 
provide a substitute for intelligence recruiters to successfully spot, assess and develop 
targets. Huzayfah’s story demonstrates the notion that human relationships can be built  
with the assistance of technology. This tool, if leveraged effectively, has the potential to  
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increase the safety, speed and efficacy of agent recruitment.  
 
RECRUIT 
Successful agent recruitment is the ultimate objective. The case officer either formally or 
informally asks the individual to spy on their own country and pass secrets to the U.S. If 
someone is formally asked to spy, a U.S. case officer will likely reveal that he or she is 
from the CIA or another IC agency and would like the individual to provide information. 
This is a classic example of direct recruitment.  
 
Recruitment requests “should make clear to potential agents that they are being presented 
with a fleeting opportunity to act on statements they have made concerning their beliefs, 
goals, and ideals” during the development phase (Burkett 15). Case officers work to 
create “a sense of urgency” and emphasize “that they have superiors who need proof of 
their agents’ utility or they will order relationships ended” (Burkett 16). If a case officer 
developed the relationship under a false flag, he or she may request government or even 
corporate insights to help Canada, for instance, stand up to the U.S. The success of the 
recruitment process is contingent on accurate assessment and effective relationship 
building during earlier stages in the cycle.  
 
Since the rise of ISIS, cities around the world have fallen victim to attacks by individuals 
motivated by the ideals of these religious extremists. Attacks by radical individuals are  
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referred to as acts of lone-wolf terrorism. These lone actors are “inspired by the 
recruitment videos and hashtag campaigns delivered via social media by the Islamic State 
and other terrorist groups” (Easterly and Geltzer). These individuals, however, are not 
given direct attack instructions from the group’s leaders. Instead, these individuals “select 
their own targets, choose their own weapons, determine their own timing, and 
increasingly, record their own press releases” (Easterly and Geltzer). Individuals swear 
loyalty to an extremist group and acts on its behalf.  
 
In 2016, Omar Mateen, a 29-year old, murdered 49 people and injured 53 others in a 
mass shooting at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Before the attack, Mateen 
posted a series of angry statements to Facebook. He was enraged by the series of 
bombings conducted to weaken the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. His posts condemned 
the west and warned of vengeance by the Islamic State (Blinder et al.). The gunman also 
spoke of his loyalty to the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In his eerie 
final post, he declared “in the next few days you will see attacks from the Islamic State in 
the USA” (Yan et al.). During the rampage, he even dialed 911 to pledge his allegiance to 
the extremist group.  
 
The following year, a man named Salman Abedi set off a suicide bomb at an Ariana 
Grande concert in Manchester, England during the final song of her set. The attack, also 
claimed by the Islamic State, took the lives of 22 people and injured 116 others. This 
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tragedy is another demonstration of the global reach of that extremist group enabled by 
online media.  
 
While both these individuals acted independently, the term “lone wolf” is misleading. In 
addition to footage of beheadings and violence, the Islamic State shrewdly uploads 
content depicting evidence of great community and camaraderie as benefits of group 
membership. One element of this community is local, in “particular towns in Syria where 
foreign fighters have found new, better homes, wives, and lives” (Easterly and Geltzer). 
The other part of that community is global, that is, by joining ISIS and operating on the 
group’s behalf, “you instantly find yourself with brothers, sisters, meaning, and a place in 
history” via online communications (Easterly and Geltzer).  
 
In his article, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic Propaganda Strategy,” 
Charlie Winter discusses the ways in which the Islamic States portrays this sense of 
brotherhood. The group frequently publishes “videos and photographic reports depicting 
istirāhat al-mujāhidīn” the concept of “fighters relaxing with tea and singing with each 
other” emphasizing the “idea of brotherhood in the caliphate” (Winter 27). As a result, 
lone individuals from outside the region are “no longer really alone - nor do they consider 
themselves to be” (Easterly and Geltzer). The Islamic State uses the internet to “build a 
virtual community of hundreds or thousands of sympathizers and recruits” (Easterly and 
Geltzer).  
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Creating a sense of “belonging” is no longer limited by physical distance. These 
“agents,” of the Islamic State are recruited and mobilized to conduct deadly attacks based 
on ideology delivered through social media. The success of the Islamic State in recruiting 
operatives through the internet presents a dangerous threat. “Agents” or martyrs of the 
Islamic State do not have to travel to the group's homebase in order to feel connected or 
to work on the group’s behalf. In essence, individuals buy into the extremist ideology and 
join their cause without physical contact. While this kind of “recruitment” is less direct 
and deliberate, it serves as a compelling example of the internet’s persuasive ability. For 
ISIS, the internet has removed the need for face to face contact with potential jihadists. 
As a result, the internet has broadened and strengthened the group’s ability to spot, 
assess, develop and recruit individuals to engage in jihad.   
 
Similarly, Abu Huzayfah developed online relationships with ISIS recruiters who 
encouraged his belief in radical ideology and convinced him to travel to Syria to join the 
jihad. They rewarded his decision with the promise of brotherhood and a life of 
fulfillment. Huzayfah felt connected and indebted to these online recruiters, people he 
had never physically met. These examples demonstrate the incredible persuasive power 
of the internet. Intelligence officers can leverage technology to reach a wide range of 
individuals and can use the breadth, speed, convenience and connectivity of technology 
to successfully recruit individuals for espionage.  
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HANDLE 
After a target accepts recruitment, the agent’s handling begins. Handling or “running” an 
asset is the effective management of agents “in order to exploit his/her access to secrets” 
(Wippl 781). Polymeropoulos compares the development and recruitment steps to a 
“romance” that sets the foundation for the “highly personal, intense, and emotional” 
(Wilder 35) relationship between an agent and handler that blossoms into a “marriage” 
once handling begins (Polymeropoulos [12:50:00]). Effective handling is “designed not 
only to collect classified information but also to stabilize and reassure the spy in the 
interest of sustaining his or her capacity to commit espionage for as long as possible” 
(Wilder 34-35). Once an individual agrees to spy, the case officer ultimately has two 
responsibilities: 1) acquire the intelligence to which the asset has access and 2) keep the 
asset safe (Morrell [12:23:00]).   
 
For an agent to remain safe, all communications with his or her case officer must go 
undetected. In order to maintain operational safety, case officers employ tradecraft 
techniques to evade surveillance and avoid detection by foreign intelligence services.  
Human intelligence collection has traditionally relied on the case officer’s ability to 
conceal from local authorities his or her affiliation with an intelligence service. This is 
the concept of cover. Case officers often travel to foreign countries claiming to be 
employees of the U.S. embassy, diplomats, students or academics with supporting cover 
stories and documentation.  
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Two dimensions of “cover” exist in spy craft: cover for action and cover for status. Cover 
for status refers to an individual’s personal and professional “identity.” An individual 
traveling abroad as a student or diplomat, for example, justifies his or her presence in a 
foreign country using cover for status. Cover for action, on the other hand, explains why 
someone is at a particular meeting site on a certain day and time. The purpose of cover is 
to ensure an intelligence officer does not attract the attention of a local 
counterintelligence service. For instance, when U.S. case officers enter a country like 
China or Russia, their presence can raise red flags especially if their true identities are 
known to the country from unrelated activities. As a result, CIA officers need defensible 
cover identities to justify their international travel and work assignments.  
 
In the first several decades of the CIA, successfully deploying case officers required 
“creating a plausible alias or “legend” for an undercover officer; that officer’s ability to 
convince anyone who cared that he was the person he said he was; and having the 
documents to buttress that legend” (Naylor). For example, famous CIA technicians like 
Antonio J. “Tony” Mendez worked as professional forgers. Mendez helped maintain 
upwards of 15,000 aliases at the CIA and created forged ID cards, birth certificates, 
school records, passports, visas and plane tickets. 
 
Over time, the CIA increased its sophistication and built “aliases for its officers that 
allowed them to pretend that they were neutral [citizens of] ‘third countries’ - neither the  
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United States nor the country in which they were operating” with matching paper trails 
(Naylor). Most CIA officers work under official cover, meaning that they pretend to work 
as a U.S. diplomat assigned to an embassy abroad. Others work under non-official cover 
abroad in the private sector without the safety net of diplomatic immunity.  
 
One compelling example of a successful operation using cover identities and disguises 
was the mission to exfiltrate six American diplomats sheltered by the Canadian Embassy 
in Tehran after the U.S. embassy was taken over in 1979 by Iranian revolutionaries. This 
mission inspired the film “Argo.” On January 25, 1980, after opening a fictional 
production office in Los Angeles, Six Studios Productions, creating the career histories 
for the six Canadian “diplomats,” and promoting a new sci-fi film on U.S. media outlets, 
Antonio Mendez, the inspiration for Ben Affleck’s character, traveled to Tehran under 
Canadian alias “Kevin Cost Harkins” (Smith). Upon arrival, Mendez and his CIA 
colleague, Julio, spent several days coaching the diplomats on their new identities as 
cameramen and set designers and preparing them for their exit interrogations at Tehran’s 
Airport. On January 28th, Mendez managed to safely smuggle the six Americans out of 
Tehran through the use of cover identities. His tenure with a CIA was “effectively a 
geopolitical theater” (Smith). He used “techniques from magicians, movie makeup artists 
and even the television show Mission: Impossible” and transformed “agents into 
characters with backstories, costumes, and documents that helped them evade detection 
and avoid capture in foreign countries” (Smith).  
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Today, however, even with the most creative talent, identification software has created 
new challenges to maintaining cover. According to Duyane Norman, former senior CIA 
official, “the foundations of the business of espionage have been shattered” (McLaughlin 
and Dorfman). In the digital age, “a cover identity that would have been almost bullet 
proof 20 years ago can now be unraveled in a few minutes” (Lucas). Digital histories 
pose a serious threat to officers’ cover legends. Foreign states have the ability to track 
everything from credit-card transactions and internet searches to social media postings 
and car rentals. These advances are a double-edged sword. The activities of officers born 
in the age of the internet have digital trails that undermine their cover identities while 
having no digital record is similarly suspicious. Instead of relying on disguises and 
memorized cover stories, individuals traveling undercover now must have plausible 
digital histories.  
 
Emerging biometric technology has strained the ability for intelligence officers to travel 
in alias identities. In the 2000s, there was a “biometric explosion,” that is, an increase in 
fingerprint, facial recognition and iris scanning technology. Biometric technology poses a 
threat to officers traveling abroad with assumed cover identities. According to former 
acting CIA Director Michael Morrell, “facial recognition and biometrics make it very 
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For example, Singapore “developed a database that incorporated real-time flight,  
customs, hotel, and taxicab data” (McLaughlin and Dorfman). Together, this information 
“would trigger an alert to Singaporean security systems” in the case that it “took too long 
for a traveler to get from the airport to a hotel in a taxi” (McLaughlin and Dorfman). If 
the security system was alerted, the Singaporean intelligence services would go to the 
hotel and monitor the suspected individuals through TVs and phones. According to an 
anonymous intelligence official, “you used to be able to fly into a country on one name 
and have meetings in another” (McLaughlin and Dorfman). CIA was forced to halt 
operations in Singapore due to the safety threat to case officers traveling in an alias 
identity. 
 
Additionally, a new video application, owned by the Chinese government, known as 
TikTok, may have serious national security implications. TikTok is a social media 
platform where users share short videos, usually fun dances to catchy music. The app, 
released in 2017, has been downloaded over 100 million times in the United States and 1 
billion times around the world. In 2018, TikTok was downloaded to user devices more 
than Facebook, Snapchat, and Instagram. The company, which spends over $3 million 
every day on advertising, requires new users to register with their name, email, and other 
personal information (Banks). Not only does the video application collect personal data, 
TikTok captures “close-ups of people’s faces, allowing the company to gather biometric 
data on its users” (Q. Wong) and uses AI algorithms to “record and track users’ faces” 
(Banks).  
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Biometric technology has already increased the difficulty of traveling under alias abroad. 
In late 2018, investigations revealed that TikTok stored much of its user data within 
China. As a result, “data localization laws grant the Chinese government unrestrained 
access to data stored in its territory,” potentially jeopardizing the privacy and personal 
information of U.S. citizens and other individuals all over the world (Banks). Today, the 
company claims that its data is stored in the U.S., however, many fear that “data sharing 
with Chinese intelligence services is still possible” (Banks). The ability to record and 
track users’ faces is problematic for the U.S. intelligence community. TikTok’s immense 
user base provides an abundance of personal data to the Chinese intelligence services that 
can undermine the safety of U.S. human intelligence missions and citizens traveling 
abroad.  
 
The “dead drop” of “dead letter box” has historically been one of the most important 
techniques for case officers and agents to communicate securely. A dead drop can be 
defined as a “method of spycraft used to pass items or information between two 
individuals using a secret location, thus not requiring them to meet directly, so as to 
maintain operational security” (Greenberg). During this coordinated exchange between 
two individuals, typically an asset and a case officer, one party leaves a physical object, 
either a piece of paper, equipment, cash, or some other item in a designated location. 
After a period of time, the other party will come to retrieve the “cache” at the site.  
Infamous spies, like former FBI special agent Robert Hanssen, used dead drops to  
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communicate with their Russian handlers. One of Hanssen’s favored dead drop locations 
was under a footbridge in Foxstone Part in Vienna, Virginia. Here, Hanssen would hide 
computer disks and documents in a bag of trash. He would then stick a piece of tape on a 
park sign to notify his case officer to retrieve his cache. 
 
Hanssen was arrested in this same park while placing a package containing classified 
information for his Russian handlers (“Robert Hanssen”). The New York Times senior 
director of information security, Runa Sandvik, describes the dead drop as “a way to 
control exactly how and when a package is delivered and who has the ability to pick it up, 
to control more of the variables and never have to meet in person” (Greenberg). While 
the dead drop has been an effective tool for communications between agents and 
handlers, the digital revolution has started to change the rules of this game. New 
technological developments have made detection easier and security increasingly 
difficult.  
 
The mobile phone, an excellent “tracking beacon,” presents new challenges for 
traditional tradecraft techniques like the dead drop (Lucas). For instance, Russian 
counterintelligence services can easily monitor the movements of mobile phones in 
Moscow. As a result, the intelligence service could match the movements of individuals 
based on a “phone signal that pings in the same location in the same time window” as  
another mobile device near a suspected dead-drop location and effectively uncover the  
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identities foreign assets and U.S. officials (Lucas). The obvious solution would be to not 
carry a cell phone, yet in the digital world, it would be suspicious for an individual to live 
without a mobile device.  
 
Furthermore, counterintelligence services use CCTV and other surveillance methods to 
track suspected intelligence officers. For example, Xuehua “Edward” Peng was arrested 
by the FBI as an illegal foreign agent working on behalf of China’s Ministry of State 
Security (MSS). From 2015 and 2018, Peng used dead drops to exchange information 
with a double agent run by the FBI. On four separate occasions, Peng was caught on 
camera hiring a hotel room and leaving a key for a source. He would then leave 
envelopes of cash in the room and retrieve an SD card from the foreign agent (Schapiro). 
Peng then traveled to China, presumably with the SD card, to deliver the information to 
MSS officials. The Peng case demonstrates safety risks of the digital age. The ubiquitous 
use of video technology compromised Peng’s cover and tradecraft and led to his arrest 
(Schapiro).  
 
Today, one approach to cover identities is to “hide in plain sight.” An intelligence officer 
will “actually work as the professional engineer or businessperson that they present 
themselves to be” and use “true names, though they are known to their CIA counterparts 
by a pseudonym” (McLaughlin and Dorfman). Case officers may be provided real  
identification documents in an assumed identity from the Social Security Administration, 
the Department of Health and Human Services, and the IRS while also working with 
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“digital companies, like commercially available ancestry databases, to alter personally 
identifying information, and also backdate work histories” (McLaughlin and Dorfman). 
Young people, growing up in the digital age, typically have significant digital histories. 
This presents an issue when hiring new employees at intelligence agencies. To combat 
the challenges of digital technology, government agencies and the private sector must 
cooperate with one another. 
 
For example, in 2010, after years of surveillance and analysis, the FBI arrested Anna 
Chapman along with nine other Russian officers working under “deep-cover” in the 
United States. The case, known as Operation Ghost Stories, continued for over 10 years. 
The officers, known as “illegals,” worked for the Russian foreign intelligence service, 
known as the SVR. Over the course of the operation, the Russian “illegals” established 
seemingly normal lives in the U.S. They got married, had kids, bought homes, and 
“assimilated into American society” (“Operation Ghost Stories”). According to a 
statement from the FBI, “the SVR was in it for the long haul” and the “illegals were 
content to wait decades to obtain their objective, which was to develop sources of 
information in U.S. policy making circles” (“Operation Ghost Stories”). While the 
Russian spy ring never seriously compromised U.S. national security, they had the 
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In order to communicate clandestinely, the Russian spy ring used a sophisticated method 
of digital tradecraft known as steganography. Steganography is defined as “the technique 
of hiding secret data within an ordinary, non-secret file or message in order to avoid 
detection” where “the secret data is then extracted at its destination” (Rouse). The spies 
communicated via publicly available photographs where “the pictures’ real importance 
was tucked inside, in encoded messages detailing secret meetings” (Calamia). The 
messages were encoded on the pixel level. Every digital color is a “combination of red, 
blue, and green--digitally represented as three numeric values.” Through “subtle changes 
in these numbers, the Russians hid binary code that the recipient with the right software 
could recombine into a message” (Calamia). The use of these encrypted messages hidden 
in seemingly normal online photos demonstrates new possibilities of handling agents in 
the digital age.  
 
Operation Ghost Stories serves as an excellent example of sophisticated digital tradecraft. 
Strong commercial and proprietary encryption techniques, like steganography, have 
enabled case officers and foreign agents to exchange information via the internet. While 
the Russian spy ring used outdated steganographic technology that left traces of their 
communications, secure encryption eliminates the need for physical exchanges of 
information like the traditional “dead drop” or in-person meetings, the most dangerous 
and vulnerable espionage act. New tradecraft techniques tailored to the internet offer safe 
and reliable ways for agent handling without frequent personal meetings.  
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Bellingcat, a global journalism group composed of researchers, journalists, and 
investigators, confirmed Moscow’s involvement in the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and 
his daughter on a park bench in Salisbury. The group relied on open sources and social 
media data for their investigation. The group has been successful using of publicly 
available information to solve suspicious cases. In 2004, Sergei Skripal, former Russian 
intelligence officer, was arrested by the Russian internal security service (FSB) for 
passing information to Britain’s MI6 in the 1990s and early 2000s. He was convicted of 
high treason and sentenced to 13 years in prison.  
 
In 2010, Skripal was released along with three other western agents in exchange for the 
ten Russian “illegals” involved in Operation Ghost Stories in a “spy swap” between the 
U.S., UK and Russia. After the swap, Skripal was resettled in the UK to live out the rest 
of his life. However, on March 4, 2018, Skripal and his daughter, Yulia, were found on a 
park bench in Salisbury unconscious and foaming at the mouth. The British investigation 
indicated that the pair were poisoned with nerve agents sprayed on the front doorknob of 
Skripal’s Salisbury home. Most observers assumed Russian involvement in the attack, 
but Moscow denied the allegations.  
 
Bellingcat, suspicious of Moscow’s role, continued their investigation. Two Russians, 
Alexander Yevgenievich Petrov and Ruslan Timurovich Boshirov, were the prime 
suspects in the case. CCTV footage recorded the pair arriving in London’s Gatwick  
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Airport and traveling from London’s Waterloo Station to Salisbury by train on two 
different occasions during their visit to the UK, first on March 3rd and again on March 
4th, the day of the attack. The suspects claimed to be civilian tourists with no 
involvement in the attacks. They said they had been planning a trip to Salisbury to visit 
historic sites for months. However, Aeroflot’s digital passenger manifest revealed that the 
pair “made their initial booking--and checked in online--at 20:00 GMT (22:00 Moscow 
time) on March 1, 2018, the night before their short trip to London and Salisbury” 
(Bellingcat Investigation Team). Furthermore, the names Petrov and Boshirov were 
registered in the central Russian resident database in 2009 yet “no records exist for these 
two personas prior to 2009,” suggesting that the two were traveling under flimsy alias 
identities (Bellingcat Investigation Team).  
 
Bellingcat’s analysis of open source material and photographs uncovered the real identity 
of Russian GRU officer Ruslan Boshirov. Investigators found photos and videos of 
“Boshirov,” rather, Anatoliy Chepiga, at the 2017 wedding of the daughter of Major 
General Andrey Vladimirovich Averynov, the commander of the Russian military 
intelligence service’s (GRU) military unit 29155. The ubiquitous nature of digital 
technology has made any sort of identity deception virtually impossible (Bellingcat 
Investigation Team).  





The top-left and bottom-left photos depict 
“Ruslan Boshirov.” The middle-left 
photo is the passport image of Anatoliy 
Chepiga. The right columns provide 
images of Chepiga attending the 2017 
wedding of GRU commander Major 
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Ultimately, Operation Ghost Stories demonstrates the potential of digital technology to 
improve the operational safety human intelligence missions. However, the breadth of the 
internet and open source media can undermine the security of agents. Bellingcat’s open 
source investigation of the Skripal attack accentuates the ubiquity of the internet. While 
encryption and sophisticated digital tradecraft enables agents and handlers to 
communicate securely, intelligence services must also be wary of publicly available 
online information, digital histories, and mobile devices that may threaten operational 
security and agent anonymity.  
 
MOTIVATE, COMPENSATE, TURNOVER, AND TERMINATE  
The final step of the agent acquisition cycle is termination. Termination can include 
compensation for accumulated work, the conclusion of a secret relationship that is no 
longer productive or useful to the intelligence service, or the transfer of an agent to a new 
case officer.  
 
For compensation, agents are conventionally rewarded in cash delivered by means of a 
“dead drop” of some kind. The case officer leaves money, gold or other valuables in an 
agreed upon location for the agent to pick up. However, during this exchange, the case 
officer and agent still run the risk of detection. However, new forms of electronic 
currency in the digital age, like Bitcoin for instance, provide a means of compensating 
agents that is much harder to trace. Bitcoin operates with pseudonyms. The pseudonym is  
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the “address to which you receive your Bitcoin” (“Bitcoin Anonymity”). Each transaction 
from the address is stored in the blockchain that “verifies the transaction between buyer 
and seller” (Newby and Razmazma). Bitcoin inventor, Satoshi Nakamoto, recommends 
using “a new (address)...each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common 
owner” (“Bitcoin Anonymity”). If an individual is ever linked to that particular 
pseudonym, the Bitcoin transactions associated with that pseudonym are no longer 
anonymous. The development of cryptocurrencies offers an increased degree of privacy 
and anonymity when employed strategically compared to traditional methods of 
compensating sources.  
 
Digitization also enables easy agent turnover. For instance, a case officer may be 
reassigned to a new region or division. Digital information is easily transferred to the 
replacement officer. The turnover may even be invisible to the agent who has never met 
the person who recruited him or her online. A new handling officer can simply carry out 
the handling relationship in the role of the recruiting case officer. Without the need for 
physical documents and in-person meetings, case officer and agent interactions are faster 
and safer.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Digital technology is profoundly changing the discipline of human intelligence gathering.   
New data and digitization technologies make each phase of the agent recruitment cycle  
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safer, faster and easier. With a few clicks of a mouse, one can discover someone’s 
relationship status, travel history, hobbies, academic background, employment status 
along with ideas about worldviews and political orientation. Case officers can analyze 
public online information to spot and assess agents from inside the walls of the CIA or a 
field station abroad.  
 
Online communication platforms, chat rooms and game centers give case officers a way 
to develop online relationships with targeted individuals so that physical contact is no 
longer essential to establishing trust. A number of examples demonstrate the relationship 
building power of the internet. ISIS jihad recruits buy into radical ideology from online 
propaganda and conversations with recruiters. The world has witnessed the devastating 
power of online relationships as lone-wolf actors under the control of the Islamic State 
have terrorized nightclubs and concerts. Ultimately, the internet is a powerful tool that 
has created and mobilized movements, revolutions, and connected people all over the 
world. Intelligence agencies, at home and abroad, can benefit from the limitless reach of 
technology to safely, quickly and efficiently recruit and handle foreign agents.  
 
However, the impact of technology is reciprocal. In an episode of the Intelligence 
Matters podcast, Michael Morrell, former acting director of the CIA, interviewed Glenn 
Gaffney, former director of Science and Technology at the CIA and currently the 
executive vice president of in-Q-Tel, who explained that advancing technology is  
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“creating more and more attack surfaces” for adversaries (Gaffney [11:45:00]). The IoT 
as it stands for the “Internet of Things,” can also be thought of as the “Internet of 
Threats” (Gaffney [11:47:00]). As a result, the U.S. IC must develop an “evolving 
understanding of the nature of attack surfaces, the way we are being attacked and how we 
respond within that space” (Gaffney [12:06:00]). While digitization has the potential to 
increase the efficacy of the agent recruitment cycle, technology invites new challenges 
for the intelligence community.  
 
The CIA has already fallen victim to these hazards. For example, in 2003, Hassan 
Mustafa Omar Nsar also known as Abu Omar, a Muslim cleric and alleged member of 
Egyptian radical movement Gama’a al-Islamiyya, a terrorist organization supported by 
Osama Bin Laden, was abducted outside of his home in Milan, Italy. In the 90s, after 
residing in Albania, Abu Omar had been expelled from that country for his role in 
planning an attack on an Egyptian minister. He moved first to Germany and then was 
granted political asylum in Italy in 2001. In Italy, he served as an imam at a radical 
mosque and in an Islamic cultural center visited by Islamic radicals, many of whom 
eventually were detained, arrested and convicted for recruiting jihadists. Abu Omar was 
abducted and flown to Egypt as part of an “extraordinary rendition.” He claimed that the 
Egyptians interrogated and tortured him. Italian police deemed this abduction a 
kidnapping and launched a thorough investigation into the incident.  
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After “tying their cell phones to a place and time at which Nasr was thrown into the van”  
as well as credit card, hotel and car rental information, Italian law enforcement convicted 
23 Americans for the abduction (Stutser). Milan prosecutor Armando Spataro was able to 
identify the names of several American diplomats and CIA’s Milan base chief Robert 
Lady along with other CIA officers. Furthermore, a flight itinerary along with 
surveillance photographs of Abu Omar corroborated Lady’s involvement in the 2003 
abduction. The assortment of traced phone calls as well as credit card and hotel records 
provided Italian investigators with the evidence, they needed to convict a number of 
Americans complicit in the abduction of Abu Omar. This incident embarrassed the US 
government and imposed political costs (Sisti).  
 
In order to stay abreast in the digital age, the IC must employ technology in a way that 
seems natural while considering “all of the different ways that a would-be attacker might 
exploit those systems” (Gaffney [11:38:00]). As technology develops, it is important to 
ensure these advances “behave the way you would expect them to on the streets” 
(Gaffney). The IC is stocked with great talent and strong relationships with private firms 
that drive technological advancement. The differentiating force between “winning” on 
the world-wide scale is the creativity in the application of developing technologies. The 
“method of delivery” of new technology is equally as important as the technology itself 
(Gaffney). The merger of technology and creativity is the key to intelligence success in 
the digital age.  
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Gaffney confirms the importance of “understanding our [the US] own signatures and our 
behaviors” within a network when it comes to espionage. This helps decipher what is and 
is not normal in terms of behavior. Departing from normal patterns is suspicious and 
potentially compromising. Operation Ghost Stories illustrated how steganography was 
used effectively in agent communications for over 10 years before being discovered by 
the FBI. The Russian “illegals” managed to clandestinely communicate for decades 
through the unassuming, unseen pixels of digital photos. While technology provides new 
avenues and tools with which to operate and communicate, the art of espionage remains 
unchanged.  
 
The ongoing coronavirus pandemic provides an interesting real-world scenario that 
demonstrates how human behavior adapts to changed conditions. What is normal 
behavior in the context of COVID-19? Most countries are under stay-at-home / shelter-
in-place orders. People are expected to stay at home, only visit the grocery store or 
pharmacy periodically, possibly go outside for exercise, and maintain a safe social 
distance. In April and May of 2020, amid a global virus outbreak, this is normal behavior. 
On the other hand, frequently leaving home, talking to people face to face, and long 
drives to places other than essential businesses, is not normal behavior. This behavior is 
abnormal and suspicious. It is, however, the traditional signature of human intelligence 
activity.   
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Technology and creativity when paired with routine behavior, achieves the central goal of 
espionage--collecting valuable national security information without being compromised. 
At last, digital technology has the potential to streamline agent recruitment and increase 
the security and efficacy of the process. The U.S. IC must embrace the opportunities 
offered by the digital age and employ technology to enhance its fundamental 
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